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Judicial Review of the Zoning of Adult
Entertainment: A Search for the
Purposeful Suppression of Protected
Speech
ALFRED C. YEN*
The conflict surrounding the zoning of adult entertainment is not novel.
The antagonism stems from a community's right to provide for its social wel-
fare and the adult entertainment provider's right to freedom of speech and ex-
pression. This article examines the evolution of the federal courts' analysis in
this area. The author concludes by stating that the current method of review
is not the most efficient. In its place, he proposes a new method that makes
analysis simpler for both laypersons and the courts.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court firmly established the broad power of zoning
in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company.' Municipalities were
given the power to further the public health, safety, morals, and wel-
fare by restricting the permissible uses of land.2 Since that decision,
zoning has developed into a powerful tool for controlling and shaping
urban life. Zoning now affects much more than the location of ob-
* B.S., M.S., 1980, Stanford University; J.D., 1983, Harvard Law School; Member
of the California Bar; Associate Attorney, Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Los
Angeles, California.
1. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). For a history of the establishment of the power to zone in
this country, see generally 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 3.01-.13 (2d
ed. 1976).
2. One commentator has described the methodology of zoning as follows:
Zoning ordinances are designed to regulate the complexities of modern
land usage by separating incompatible uses, by limiting the density and scale
of various neighborhoods, and by prohibiting or restricting the development of
underdeveloped lands. Under a zoning system, every type of land use is classi-
fied with regard to its benefits and its harmful effects. Uses are then allowed
to locate in areas where their benefits to society are maximized and prohibited
where their harmful effects outweigh the benefits.
Note, The Zoning of Adult Entertainment: How Far Can Planning Commissions Go?,
5 CoMM/ENT. L.J. 293, 295 (1983) (footnote omitted).
noxious land uses. It preserves historical landmarks,3 encourages de-
velopment, and controls disorderly growth.4 Such efforts have
contributed immensely to the quality of modern life.
However, zoning also contains the potential for the abuse of consti-
tutional rights. The same tool which assures controlled community
development can be used to exclude racial minorities5 or effectively
deprive land owners of their property. 6 Zoning may collide with first
amendment rights as well. Any zoning of churches,7 outdoor signs,8
or entertainment 9 raises questions about the separation of church
3. See, e.g., New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law (codified at N.Y.C.
ADMIN. CODE, ch. 8-A, §§ 205-1.0-207-10.0 (1976)). This ordinance was enacted pursuant
to New York State's enabling act (codified at N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 96-a (McKinney
1977)), and was upheld in the landmark case of Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
4. 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at § 7.01. See also Golden v. Planning Bd., 30
N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
This case held that an amendment to a town zoning ordinance was constitutional
where it provided that subdivision development would not be permitted until, accord-
ing to the town's 18-year capital plan, the availability of proposed municipal services
reached a specified level.
5. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,
67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975), in which a local ordinance,
neutral on its face, was struck down because it had a disparate impact on minority
groups. The ordinance involved permitted only single family detached dwellings and
was so restrictive in its minimum lot size, lot frontage, and building size requirements
as to preclude even moderate income families from moving there. The result of the
ordinance was to effectively deny minority groups the opportunity to live in the area
since they almost always fell within the low to moderate income classification.
6. In Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), the Supreme Court struck
down a zoning ordinance requiring residential building only, based on the finding of a
special master that plaintiff's land was of no practical use for residential purposes be-
cause, among other reasons, "there would not be adequate return on the amount of
any investment for the [residential] development of the property." Id. at 187. See also
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The two major issues
in that case were 1) did the zoning law enacted in New York City amount to a taking
of private property for public use under the fifth amendment and, if so, 2) was ade-
quate compensation paid to the property owner for that taking.
7. See, e.g., Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur, Ind. Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses,
233 Ind. 83, 117 N.E.2d 115 (1954). This case involved an offstreet parking requirement
that effectively prohibited the building of a proposed church. The Supreme Court of
Indiana found that enforcement of this ordinance against the church organization
would "restrict the right of freedom of worship and assembly to an extent that out-
weighs any benefit to the safety, health and general welfare of the public, and in such
a situation the police power must yield to the constitutional right of freedom of wor-
ship and assembly." Id. at 94, 117 N.E.2d at 121.
8. See, e.g., San Diego, Cal., Ordinance No. 10795 (Mar. 14, 1972). This ordinance
prohibited off-premises outdoor advertising signs, including billboards, for the purpose
of eliminating hazards to pedestrians and motorists brought about by distracting signs.
A divided United States Supreme Court struck down the law in Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), on the ground that it constituted an abridgment
of first amendment rights.
9. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981). The Court in
this case struck down a zoning law which banned any type of live entertainment from
operation within the town. For further discussion of this case, see infra notes 53-54,
67-70 and accompanying text.
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and state or freedom of speech. In the extreme, it may be contended
that zoning laws may never be constitutionally enforced against a
land use which can invoke some sort of first amendment protection.
Intuitively, such complete protection is impossible. Land uses associ-
ated with the exercise of first amendment rights may be incompati-
ble with other land uses. For example, billboards may be considered
eyesores which detract from the appearance of neighborhoods.10 So-
ciety has a strong interest in regulating obnoxious land uses even
when the first amendment is involved, so regulation should be per-
mitted as long as constitutional rights are not unnecessarily
infringed."1
The zoning of establishments which offer adult, non-obscene en-
tertainment12 illustrates the tension between the zoning power and
the first amendment. Like many commercial land uses, adult estab-
lishments create litter, noise, traffic congestion and bright lights dur-
ing evening hours. Additionally, adult establishments are often
associated with neighborhood decay and crime.13 Towns legitimately
zone both adult and non-adult uses in an effort to eliminate these
complications of modern urban life. Occasionally adult establish-
ments are properly singled out for special zoning to better regulate
these problems.14 However, the issue of adult zoning15 does not end
here. Local communities are often hostile to the sexually explicit na-
ture of adult entertainment. These towns may zone adult establish-
ments not in an effort to regulate community problems, but in an
effort to restrict or suppress adult speech itself.16 Such use of the
10. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 510-11.
11. For example, in Decatur, Ind. Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, 233 Ind. at 94, 117
N.E.2d at 121, the zoning ordinance was invalidated because first amendment rights
significantly outweighed any benefit to the health, safety, and welfare of the public.
See supra note 7. Presumably it is possible for health and safety concerns to outweigh
first amendment rights in other situations.
12. All adult entertainment is not necessarily constitutionally obscene. Only ob-
scene entertainment is speech not entitled to first amendment protection. All other
adult entertainment would receive just as much first amendment protection as any
other entertainment. See Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54 (1973).
13. For example, Boston has created a so-called "combat zone" by limiting adult
establishments to a two-block downtown area. F. STROM, ZONING CONTROL OF SEX
BUSINESSES 7 n.26 (1977).
14. See, e.g., Detroit, Mich., Ordinances 742-G and 743-G (Nov. 2, 1972) (amending
CITY OF DETROIT, MICH., OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCES §§ 32.0007, 32.0023, 66.0000,
66.0101, 66.0103 (1962)). These ordinances were challenged and upheld in Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
15. The term "adult zoning" will be used to refer to the zoning of adult
establishments.
16. See, e.g., Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson, 667 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1981), mod-
zoning power is hostile to the first amendment because adult speech
is entitled to constitutional protection.
In 1976, the Supreme Court addressed this specific conflict between
zoning power and the protection of speech under the first amend-
ment in Young v. American Mini Theatres.17 The case involved a
zoning ordinance adopted by the city of Detroit' 8 which prohibited
adult theaters and bookstores from locating within a thousand feet of
any two other regulated uses or within five hundred feet of a residen-
tial area.19 "Regulated uses" were defined to include adult theaters,
adult bookstores, cabarets, bars, pawnshops, hotels, and second hand
stores, among others.20 Adult theaters and bookstores were defined
primarily by reference to "Specified Sexual Activities" and "Specified
Anatomical Areas."2 1 The plaintiff raised three constitutional claims:
1) that the statute's vagueness resulted in a violation of due process;
2) that the statute infringed upon protected speech in violation of the
first amendment; and 3) that the classification of theaters on the ba-
sis of the content of their exhibitions violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 22
A plurality of the Court rejected all three claims.23 Justice Powell
concurred, joining the plurality on claims one and two, but avoiding
the issue of equal protection entirely. Powell viewed the case pri-
marily as one concerning land use regulation and the first amend-
ment.24 Thus, a majority of the Court ruled that the Detroit
ordinance was valid under the first amendment. 25
After the Court's decision in Young, many municipalities felt that
they were free to zone adult establishments as they wished.26 How-
ified on other grounds, 668 F.2d 137 (1982). For a discussion of this case, see infra
notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
17. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
18. See supra note 14.
19. 427 U.S. at 52.
20. CITY OF DETROIT, MICH., OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCES § 66.0000 (1962). See
also Young, 427 U.S. at 52 n.3.
21. CITY OF DETROIT, MICH., OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCES § 32.0007 (1962), dis-
cussed in Young, 427 U.S. at 53 n.4.
22. 427 U.S. at 58.
23. Id. at 58-73. The opinion of the Court was delivered by Justice Stevens and
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell (except for Part III), and
Rehnquist. A major factor in the Court's decision upholding the ordinance was the
principle that a community's efforts to preserve the quality of life and the character of
its neighborhoods is constitutionally justified as a legitimate state interest. Id. at 71-72.
The "quality of life" concept was first articulated by Professor Bickel. Slaton, 413 U.S.
at 59 (citing 22 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 25-26 (1971)).
24. 427 U.S. at 73 (Powell, J., concurring).
25. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
26. Apparently many towns felt that the use of the "dispersal" technique at-
tempted in Detroit and upheld in Young would insulate their laws from first amend-
ment challenges. Some of the cities to unsuccessfully attempt this strategy include
Minneapolis, Minnesota, Galveston, Texas, and Keego Harbor, Michigan. The respec-
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ever, in 1981, the Supreme Court again considered the question of
adult zoning in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim27 and indicated
that localities did not have as much freedom as some had originally
thought after the Young decision. The Court applied the first
amendment to strike down a zoning law which banned live entertain-
ment, particularly nude dancing, from town.28 The law had been
used to convict and fine the owners of an adult bookstore which of-
fered live nude dancing to its patrons. The Court made it clear that
Young was not the last word on zoning which regulates protected
speech, and that all non-obscene entertainment, including nude danc-
ing, was protected under the first amendment.29
Lower courts quickly followed the leadership provided by the
Supreme Court in Schad. Since 1981, the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Circuit Courts of Appeals have invalidated zoning laws which regu-
lated non-obscene adult speech.30 It is now clear that mere imitation
of the Detroit law upheld in Young will not insulate zoning from
close first amendment scrutiny.
This paper will examine first amendment judicial review of adult
zoning, particularly from 1981 to the present. Close attention will be
given to the analysis developed by the Supreme Court in Young and
Schad. The Court's analysis will be evaluated and criticized, and it
will be shown that the federal appellate courts are aware of such ana-
lytical problems and are attempting to rectify them. Lastly, this arti-
cle will propose a revision of the Supreme Court's analysis which is
designed to give adult speech full constitutional protection while sim-
plifying the courts' task as reviewers of adult zoning.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF ADULT ZONING UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH
A. Organization of Analysis along Two Tracks
The Supreme Court has organized first amendment review of regu-
tive ordinances were struck down in Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 698 F.2d 936
(8th Cir. 1983); Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1982); and
Keego Harbor Co. v. City of Keego Harbor, 657 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1981).
27. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
28. MOUNT EPHRAIM, N.J., CODE § 99-15B (1979).
29. 452 U.S. at 71.
30. See supra note 26. The Ninth Circuit has also handed down decisions which
have limited the power of adult zoning laws. See, e.g., Ebel v. City of Corona, 698 F.2d
390 (9th Cir. 1983); Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1982).
lations affecting speech along two tracks.31 First, if the law is aimed
directly at the content of the speech itself ("content based"), then a
strict categorization test is used. The regulation is invalid unless the
suppressed speech can be placed into a few selected categories.32
This is the track I analysis. Second, if the law is aimed at harm unre-
lated to the content of the message conveyed, then the infringement
upon speech is balanced against the governmental interest furthered
by the regulation.33 This is the track II analysis.
The difference between the types of regulations which trigger each
track can be easily illustrated. If a law prohibits the use of foul lan-
guage, then the strict categorization test would be used because the
law is aimed directly at the content of the speaker's message. 34 On
the other hand, if a law merely restricts the use of loudspeakers, the
balancing test would be used because the law is not aimed directly at
the content of the speaker's message. Instead, the law may be justi-
fied as reasonably necessary to prevent excessive noise in the sur-
rounding neighborhood. 35
The choice of which track to employ in the review of adult zoning
regulations is a difficult one. Non-obscene adult speech is entitled to
first amendment protection, 36 however, adult zoning ordinances often
single out adult establishments for harsh treatment, sometimes driv-
ing the adult speech out of town.37 When especially harsh treatment
of adult establishments is based on the nature of speech expressed in
those establishments, then a track I strict categorization test would
be appropriate since the regulation is aimed at the content of pro-
tected speech. On the other hand, adult establishments occasionally
do warrant special treatment. Adult uses are associated with violent
crime, sexual offenses, and neighborhood decay, and cities should be
able to regulate adult uses for the purpose of fighting these evils. 38
31. Case Comment, Regulation of Live Entertainment: Schad v. Borough of
Mount Ephraim, 95 HARV. L. REV. 231, 235 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Case Comment];
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 812-2, at 582 (1978).
32. See, e.g., Slaton, 413 U.S. at 49 (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words). See also supra note 31.
33. See, e.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (an attempt to curtail
littering by banning handbills is not directed at communicative impact because the
harm would arise even if the handbills were blank). See supra note 31.
34. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971) (the banning of a display
of obscene language on a jacket was a constitutional infringement).
35. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (the banning of a sound track on
public streets was not a violation of first amendment freedoms).
36. See supra note 12.
37. See, e.g., Basiardanes, 682 F.2d at 1205, in which a zoning ordinance was invali-
dated as unconstitutional because it completely banned adult theater street advertising
and was far more restrictive than necessary to achieve its purported goals.
38. See Young, 427 U.S. 50. As indicated supra at note 23, there is a legitimate
state interest in regulation for the purpose of preserving the quality of life in the
community.
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The goals of such regulation would not be the suppression of speech,
but the promotion of the public welfare. This suggests a track II bal-
ancing test.
For the most part, courts have chosen to review adult zoning laws
under the track II balancing test.39 However, judges are uncomforta-
ble as balancers. In order to ascertain the "weight" of the factors in a
balancing equation, judges must make detailed inquiries on an ad hoc
basis. These ad hoc inquiries invite inherently arbitrary determina-
tions by the court in assigning "weights" to the various factors to be
balanced. Even if quantitative figures for those weights could be
firmly established, no definitive calculus for balancing those factors
could possibly be developed. Each judge must rely on his own sense
of balance.
Such balancing contrasts sharply with the judge's role in analysis
along track I, where the courts are far less arbitrary. Regulations
aimed at the content of speech are invalidated with very few small,
well-defined exceptions.40 Courts are generally more comfortable
with this analysis, for judicial review is legitimated by its adherence
to the requirements of the Constitution.41 Use of strict rules of the
track I type makes such adherence easier for the court when rules
will properly serve the Constitution. Balancing invites judges to sub-
stitute their own values for those of the Constitution, and this jeopar-
dizes the legitimacy of judicial review. 42
As shown above, track II balancing is far from an ideal method of
analysis for the judicial review of adult zoning. However, balancing
is still the primary tool used in scrutinizing constitutionally suspect
zoning regulations; therefore, this paper's proposed revision must be
postponed until after a closer look at balancing along track II.
39. The Supreme Court in Young, 427 U.S. 50, used the track II balancing test in
its analysis, resulting in a similar approach in subsequent adult zoning cases. The ulti-
mate outcome in most cases will be a holding that the law is valid, since it is likely that
there will be other legitimate purposes served by the law. See L. TRIBE, supra note 30,
at 583.
40. See supra note 32. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 30, at 583. Tribe indicates
that if a track I analysis is employed, the statute or ordinance will almost always be
invalidated as an impermissible abridgment of free speech.
41. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
42. In other words, when rules are well-designed to serve the Constitution, judges
know that judicial review pursuant to those rules will be theoretically legitimate. On
the other hand, when a judge is forced to use her own set of values, there can be no
guarantee of constitutional support for those values or their application. "[B]alancing
tests inevitably become intertwined with the ideological predispositions of those doing
the balancing .... " Ely, Fag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categoriza-
tion and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1501 (1975).
B. Judicial Review of Adult Zoning along Track 11
Once a court decides that a zoning regulation is not clearly aimed
at the content of protected speech, analysis proceeds along track II.
This analysis involves the weighing of three factors: 1) the extent to
which the zoning infringes upon protected speech; 2) the extent to
which the zoning fails to serve a substantial governmental interest;
and 3) the extent to which alternative or less restrictive regulations
could serve the same governmental interest.43
1. The Extent of Infringement upon Protected Speech
The first problem a court must confront is whether or not a chal-
lenged zoning law restricts protected adult speech, and if so, the sig-
nificance of that infringement. Intuitively, any zoning which affects
adult establishments restricts protected speech to some extent.44 A
zoning ordinance regulating the location of an adult theater does af-
fect the rights of the theater owner and moviegoers, but this seems
different from a law which completely prohibits a number of adult
theaters from opening or continuing to operate.
The Supreme Court focused on precisely this distinction in
Young.45 The Court held that the key inquiry was not whether the
regulation affected speech in any way, but whether or not access to
adult speech was impaired.46 Detroit's scheme of dispersing adult es-
tablishments through zoning was found not to significantly alter the
ability of supply to meet the demand for adult speech.47 The ordi-
nance did not affect the location of existing uses, and it left ample
space for the introduction of new adult establishments. Thus, the
market for adult speech was not impaired.48 The Court specifically
noted, however, that the situation would be quite different if "the or-
dinance had the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting access to,
lawful speech." 49 Having found no such restriction on first amend-
ment protected speech, the Court ruled in favor of the constitutional-
ity of Detroit's zoning ordinance.5o
43. Case Comment, supra note 31, at 240.
44. In addition to prohibiting the mere existence of adult uses, a zoning law may
infringe upon free speech by merely affecting the economic viability of adult uses,
thereby effectively prohibiting their establishment. For a discussion of economic via-
bility as a factor in the judicial review of adult zoning, see Note, supra note 2, at 293.
45. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
46. Id. at 62, 78. Indeed, the Court acknowledged that the ordinance was not being
challenged oh the basis that it denied access to the market but rather on the basis that
it denied access to adult speech entirely.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 71 n.35. The ordinance did not affect the operation of existing establish-
ments, only the locations of new ones.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 72-73.
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The importance of this holding is underscored by later cases in
which other towns imitated Detroit's dispersal scheme, but with the
effect of severely restricting the market for adult speech.S1 For ex-
ample, in Alexander v. City of Minneapolis,52 the court invalidated
an ordinance which effectively eliminated two-thirds of the adult
bookstore locations in the city of Minneapolis. This was held to be a
severe restriction on the market for first amendment protected adult
speech. 53 Similarly, courts have struck down laws which effectively
banned adult uses from town,5 4 as well as ordinances which explicitly
banned all live entertainment.5 5 Each of these cases was distin-
guished from Young in the same way: the zoning restricted the mar-
ket for adult speech.56
The cases show that federal courts are primarily concerned with
restrictions on the supply of and demand for adult speech where first
amendment rights are concerned. However, this inquiry is compli-
cated by problems with defining the market for adult speech. In gen-
eral, the most logical choice is the city or town whose zoning laws are
under review. This makes sense for most cities since the patrons of
adult establishments will presumably come primarily from the city
responsible for the regulation. However, smaller communities have
argued that considering only the market for adult speech found
within the city whose zoning is being reviewed is inappropriate since
city residents often go out of town to find entertainment.5 7 Thus, an
ample adult speech market may exist within easy reach just beyond
the city limits. Smaller towns contend that this "out of town" mar-
ket must be considered in determining whether or not a restriction
upon the market for adult speech exists. This argument, however, is
susceptible to attack on three grounds.
51. See Special Project, Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1427,
1557 (1978) ("In the wake of Mini Theatres, many municipalities enacted pornography
zoning laws, usually imitating Detroit by requiring adult business to be dispersed.").
52. 698 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1983).
53. Id. at 938-39. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the
challenged zoning ordinance would "greatly suppress access to adult theatres and
bookstores." Id. at 939.
54. See, e.g., Basiardanes, 682 F.2d at 1203 (zoning ordinance banned adult theaters
from much of the city, leaving only areas completely unsuited for such use); Keego
Harbor, 657 F.2d at 94 (under the terms of the ordinance, no place was provided within
the confines of the city to locate an adult theater).
55. See Schad, 452 U.S. at 61 (live entertainment, including nude dancing, pro-
tected by the first and fourteenth amendments).
56. Schad, 452 U.S. at 76; Alexander, 698 F.2d at 939; Basiardanes, 682 F.2d at 1214.
57. See, e.g., Playtime Theatres, Inc. v. City of Renton, 748 F.2d 527, 538 (9th Cir.
1984); Keego Harbor, 657 F.2d at 94.
First, the existence of an ample market for adult speech outside
the city does not justify the city's suppression of the market within
its borders. The only way a city can show that there is no need for its
contribution to the adult speech market is for the city to open its bor-
ders to the speech. If the city's contribution to the market is not
needed, then no adult establishments will flourish.
Second, if cities successfully plead the existence of adult speech in
nearby communities as a justification for their own significant re-
strictions on the speech, and if all towns take similar measures, then
only the last town in a given area to restrict adult speech through
zoning will be prohibited from doing so. Other neighboring towns
will have already eliminated adult speech from their communities,
making the last town's adult speech the only such speech in the im-
mediate area. The ensuing result is an anomalous one in which only
those slowest to restrict protected speech will fall under judicial scru-
tiny, i.e., the last one to the well receives no water. These cities will
be forced to police all of the adult establishments their neighbors
were unwilling to accept within their own borders. This result is
unfair.
Third, successful pleading of the small town argument would force
the courts to articulate standards for determining just how much of
the surrounding area to include in the relevant market for adult
speech.58 Such a task would complicate the courts' task in an already
difficult area, thus increasing the likelihood of erroneous results.
The Supreme Court implicitly recognized these arguments against
the small town position in Schad.59 The Schad majority rejected
Mount Ephraim's argument that nude dancing was readily available
in nearby areas and struck down the borough's ban on live entertain-
ment. 60 The Court intimated that the borough's argument might pre-
vail if county-wide zoning existed, but since there was no such
scheme, the independence of each borough would require the court
to consider each community as a separate market for adult speech.6 1
Thus, under current doctrine, the market for adult speech will be
the area governed by the community whose zoning laws are under
review. 62 Those laws will then be examined to determine whether
they significantly interfere with the supply of and demand for adult
58. In other words, standards for whether zoning should be reviewed on a county-
wide, statewide, or some other geographical basis.
59. 452 U.S. 61 (1981). Indeed, the Court noted that "[o]ne is not to have the exer-
cise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may
be exercised in some other place." Id. at 76-77 (citing Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147,
163 (1939)).
60. 452 U.S. at 76.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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speech.63 Any significant infringement will require proper justifica-
tion if the zoning is to pass constitutional muster.6 4 The search for
this justification is the second problem the court must face.
2. The Justification of Serving a Substantial Governmental
Interest
Once a court finds that an adult zoning law significantly interferes
with protected speech, it must invalidate the law unless the zoning
can be justified as furthering a substantial governmental interest.65
The court begins by identifying a "substantial governmental inter-
est." This is fairly easy to do. The limits of the police power are very
broad, and consequently goals such as the prevention of crime, the
preservation of neighborhoods, and the regulation of nuisances have
long been considered proper objectives of zoning.66 Adult establish-
ments are often associated with crime, neighborhood decay, and the
like,6 7 so cities' attempts to justify their adult zoning laws as neces-
sary to combat these evils inevitably sound proper.68 This means that
the court must decide if the interests asserted by municipalities to
justify adult zoning are actually served by the regulations under re-
view. In other words, the court must determine if the regulation is
warranted by the facts.
The groundwork for this requirement was laid out in Young. 69
The city of Detroit found that concentrations of adult establishments
caused neighborhood decay,70 and the Court held that the record con-
tained an adequate factual basis to support the city's conclusions. 7'
Thus Detroit's dispersal of adult establishments served the substan-
tial governmental interest of preventing urban decay and was there-
fore justified.72
Many municipalities misread Young as holding that an assertion of
neighborhood preservation would justify a restriction on the number
63. Id. at 68-71.
64. Id. at 69-71.
65. Id. at 68.
66. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); Euclid, 272 U.S. at 373,
67. See, e.g., Young, 272 U.S. at 55 (opinions from urban planners and real estate
experts).
68. In other words, any city regulating adult uses through zoning simply claims
that it is merely attempting to fight decay, crime and nuisances. If true, such asser-
tions likely bring the city within the guidelines of cases like Euclid and Berman.
69. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
70. Id. at 55.
71. Id. at 71 n.34.
72. Id. at 71-73.
of adult establishments in town as long as a dispersal type scheme
was used.73 The facts of Young do not warrant such a broad reading.
First, the Court approved neither a restriction on the number of
adult establishments nor a blanket use of dispersal.74 The Detroit
zoning law was upheld because it did not interfere with the number
of adult establishments which could locate in Detroit.75 Further-
more, the factual basis which justified the ordinance consisted of
much more than municipal assertions or conclusions about the effects
of adult uses. Detroit relied heavily on extensive testimony from
sociologists and urban planners on the effects of concentrations of
adult uses.76 This narrow reading of Young is completely justified by
subsequent cases. 77
In Schad, the Supreme Court invalidated a zoning law which
banned all live entertainment, including nude dancing.78 The Court
clearly distinguished the greater burden upon protected speech in
Schad from the lesser burden upon protected speech in Young. 79 The
Court also found no factual justification for a special zoning ordi-
nance directed at live entertainment.8 0 Mount Ephraim's zoning laws
permitted a wide range of commercial uses within city limits, and the
borough failed to establish any incompatibility between the use of
land for live entertainment, particularly nude dancing, and the use of
land for other normal commercial purposes.8 '
In Basiardanes v. City of Galveston,8 2 the Fifth Circuit followed
Schad's lead and struck down a zoning law which clearly attempted
to imitate the Detroit law upheld in Young. The law provided that:
First, a theater must be more than 500 feet from an area zoned residential, or
from any two, or any combination of two, "pool halls, liquor stores, or bars."
Second, an adult theater must be more than 1,000 feet from another adult the-
ater or adult bookstore. Third, an adult theater must be more than 1,000 feet
from any "church, school, public park, or recreational facility where minors
congregate." 8 3
The court found that this zoning effectively banned adult theaters
from Galveston.84 Thus, Young could not sustain Galveston's
73. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
74. 427 U.S. at 71. The Court approved only a "limitation on the place where adult
films may be exhibited." Id.
75. Id. at 71 n.35.
76. Id. at 81 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring).
77. See supra notes 51-64 and accompanying text.
78. 452 U.S. at 76-77.
79. Id. at 71. Mount Ephraim banned all live entertainment from the town. In
contrast, Detroit did not actually restrict the number of establishments in the city.
80. Id. at 72-73.
81. Id. at 73.
82. 682 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1982).
83. Id. at 1209. Imitation of the Detroit law upheld in Young can be seen in the
attempt to "disperse" the adult uses in town.
84. Id. at 1214. The ten to fifteen percent of the city not categorically banned to
adult uses was completely unsuited to such use.
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ordinance.85
Galveston also attempted to justify the ordinance as necessary to
fight crime and curtail deterioration of the downtown neighborhood.
The mayor and other city officials testified that they felt that the
mere existence of adult theaters created crime and urban decay.8 6
No other evidence was offered at trial.87 The court frowned upon the
weak factual basis for the ordinance, and noted the sharp difference
in the facts from those in Young:
This paucity of evidence stands in sharp contrast to the facts of American
Mini Theatres. In that case, the Detroit Common Council had heard exten-
sive testimony before it enacted an adult theater ordinance . . . . Here, the
empty record before the Galveston City Council when it decided to regulate
adult theaters undermines its contention that the ordinance in fact furthers
the goal of rehabilitating the downtown area. No evidence was introduced to
supplement or bolster the City Council's assumption that one adult theater lo-
cated downtown and urban blight are linked.
8 8
The court further distinguished the case from Young, noting that
Galveston's ordinance applied only to adult theaters while Detroit's
applied to a wide range of uses.8 9 This difference raised doubt in the
court's mind about whether the city's true motivation was the control
of urban decay.90 Indeed, the history of the ordinance's enactment
suggested that the city was really attempting to protect the newly
renovated Grand Opera House which was located across the street
from the theater owned by Basiardanes. The protection of the Grand
Opera House was held not to be a weighty enough governmental in-
terest to justify Galveston's infringement upon protected speech.91
The Sixth Circuit used this same reasoning in Keego Harbor Co. v.
City of Keego Harbor92 to invalidate another ordinance which used a
dispersal scheme to effectively ban adult theaters from town. The
zoning prohibited adult theaters from locating within 500 feet of a li-
quor store, church, or school, or within 250 feet of a residential
area.93 The court cited Schad to distinguish the case from Young, 94
85. Id- at 1213-14. The Galveston ordinance drastically impaired the availability of
films protected for adult viewing by the first amendment, and as such could not be sus-
tained as a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation under Young. See supra
note 75 and accompanying text.
86. Id. at 1215.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1215-16.
89. Id. at 1216.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 657 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1981).
93. Id. at 96.
94. Id. at 97-98. Again, the court noted that the Young ordinance did not suppress
and then went on to search for factual justification in support of the
zoning:
Keego Harbor attempts to justify the zoning restrictions as necessary to pre-
vent "blight" and to control traffic. The City enacted this "pornography ordi-
nance," however, with little discussion. There appears to have been no
objective information presented to the City at the time of enactment of the
ordinance. At trial the bulk of the evidence was presented by a City Planner
who admitted having no special expertise with the effects of placement of
adult theatres. In light of the dearth of information considered by the City
when it enacted this ordinance, it is not surprising that the ordinance is
poorly-tailored to meet the justifications given at trial . . . . There is no evi-
dence, other than the City Planner's assertion, that the traffic pattern for
adult theatres is any different from that for traditional movie theatres ....
It is "not immediately apparent as a matter of experience," that adult movie
theatres would have a deleterious effect on a town that already has many bars
and few of the attributes of a quiet residential community.9 5
The cases previously discussed illustrate the difficult task a town
faces when it wants to restrict the market for adult speech through
zoning.96 Once a court finds an infringement of protected speech, the
city must come forward with factual justification for the zoning
under review.97 Mere suppositions and assertions on the part of the
city will not suffice. Justifications for restrictions on speech must be
substantial and independently corroborated.98
However, despite the requirement of strong and independent justi-
fication, it is still possible for a town to restrict the market for adult
speech. Schad held that if a city permits uses compatible with adult
entertainment, then it may not restrict the market for such en-
the amount of adult speech while the Keego Harbor ordinance "in effect, prohibit[ed]
adult theatres." Id. at 96.
95. Id. at 98 (quoting Schad, 452 U.S. at 73).
96. See supra notes 51-95 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., Schad, 452 U.S. at 72; Basiardanes, 682 F.2d at 1215, Keego Harbor, 657
F.2d at 98.
98. This can be implied from the fact that in Schad, Basiardanes and Keego Har-
bor, the adult zoning laws were overturned because the towns involved were unable to
come up with the factual justification required by the courts. Schad, 452 U.S. at 73;
Basiardanes, 682 F.2d at 1215-16; Keego Harbor, 657 F.2d at 98. For further examples
of zoning ordinances that were overturned due to lack of proper justification, see Play-
time Theatres, 748 F.2d at 527 (city's justification was conclusory and speculative, and
its use of other cities' experiences with respect to adult theatres was not sufficient to
sustain the burden of showing a significant governmental interest); CLR Corp. v. Hen-
line, 702 F.2d 637 (6th Cir. 1983) (city failed to make any factual justifications for the
severe infringement of first amendment rights caused by city zoning which called for
special application procedures and spacing requirements for adult bookstores located
in the city); Avalon, 667 F.2d at 659 (city failed to provide adequate factual justifica-
tions); Entertainment Concepts, Inc., III v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981) (village did not even attempt to advance a legitimate
governmental interest to support its adult moving zoning ordinance).
By contrast, in Young, the adult zoning was upheld because the law was less restric-
tive on adult' speech and because Detroit was able to introduce the testimony of soci-
ologists and urban planners to corroborate the city's contention that concentrations of
adult establishments would be detrimental to the city. Young, 427 U.S. at 71, 81 n.4
(Powell, J. concurring).
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tertainment within its borders unless the city can show that the un-
restricted existence of adult establishments will harm the town.99
Keego Harbor underscores the general hostility to severe restrictions
upon speech, but also acknowledges the possibility that a town may
be able to justify some restriction of speech. 100 No flat rule against
bans has been set forth.101 Thus, a town will be able to restrict the
market if proper justification can be found.102
3. The Requirement of Narrowly Drawn Ordinances
A balancing analysis which considers only the degree of infringe-
ment upon speech and the factual justifications offered is incomplete,
for a regulation whose infringement on speech is justified may be in-
validated if it is not narrowly drawn.108 A zoning regulation is not
narrowly drawn if it restricts speech more broadly than is necessary
to achieve its purpose.104 Zoning can fail this requirement in either of
two ways. The law may restrict more types of speech than is neces-
sary,10 5 or the law can place a greater burden than is necessary upon
speech that it properly regulates.106 Schad 107 and Basiardanes 108 il-
99. Schad, 452 U.S. at 72-74 (Mount Ephraim was not able to present evidence in
justification of its selectively excluding live entertainment from the broad range of
commercial uses permitted in the Borough).
100. 657 F.2d at 99. See also Young, 427 U.S. at 70-71 (content of the speech may
justify placing it in a different category).
101. Schad, 452 U.S. at 75 n.18. See also Keego Harbor, 657 F.2d at 99.
102. For example, a city permitting commercial uses must probably permit some
adult speech within its borders because Schad indicates that an adult use (at least live
entertainment such as nude dancing) is generally compatible with normal commercial
uses. 452 U.S. at 73. However, the city need not allow for an unlimited number of
adult establishments. This is because once a high enough number of adult uses move
into the town's commercial areas, those uses would become concentrated enough to
cause urban decay of the type regulated in Young. At that time the city would be jus-
tified in using dispersal to fight the decay. This would necessarily imply some justifi-
able limit upon the market for adult speech. Of course, the burden will be on the
municipality to show that the adult establishments were becoming too numerous to
avoid harmful concentrations.
For examples of zoning ordinances that were upheld, see Ellwest Stereo Theatres,
Inc. v. Wenner, 681 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1982) (city ordinance requiring that coin oper-
ated adult film viewing booths be visible from a continuous main aisle was a reason-
able regulation in the manner in which films may be viewed); Hart Book Stores, Inc. v.
Edmisten, 612 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 447 U.S. 929 (1980) (North Carolina
statute merely a regulation of the place and manner of expression regarding sexually
explicit material).
103. Case Comment, supra note 31, at 240.
104. Schad, 452 U.S. at 68, 74; Basiardanes, 682 F.2d at 1216.
105. See infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases concern-
ing overbroad restrictions on speech.
106. See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
lustrate the first kind of failure under the requirement, while Keego
Harbor0 9 illustrates the second kind of failure.
In Schad, Mount Ephraim had banned all forms of live entertain-
ment from town.110 The Supreme Court held that even if some live
entertainment was justifiably banned, the entire zoning law was inva-
lid because it banned certain kinds of live entertainment unnecessa-
rily."' Similarly, in Basiardanes, the Fifth Circuit noted that
Galveston's ordinance severely restricted modes of expression other
than the pornography the city was trying to control. Galveston had
defined "adult theater" to include any theater which regularly dis-
played movies which the state of Texas prohibited minors from see-
ing.'1 2 Thus, many R-rated films and the theaters which exhibited
them would have been banned from town under the zoning ordi-
nance; therefore, Galveston regulated more speech than was neces-
sary to further the alleged governmental interest."13
In contrast, the Keego Harbor court did not criticize the city's zon-
ing as overinclusive. Instead, the court held that less burdensome
regulations could adequately serve the city's interest in traffic con-
trol.114 The court suggested the increased ticketing of violators as a
less intrusive means of serving the governmental interest involved.115
Interestingly, strong use of the narrowly drawn requirement forces
cities to be creative in their regulation of adult uses. For example, in
Ellwest Stereo Theatres, Inc. v. Wenner, " 6 the Ninth Circuit upheld a
clever method of controlling the sexual offenses which sometimes oc-
cur at adult theaters. The city of Phoenix, Arizona required all adult
theaters to make their film viewing booths generally visible to others
in the theater who were not watching the film. By eliminating the
privacy which gave film viewers the opportunity to sexually stimu-
late themselves, the ordinance effectively curbed criminal sexual ac-
107. 452 U.S. at 61.
108. 682 F.2d at 1203.
109. 657 F.2d at 94.
110. 452 U.S. at 64. Section 99-4 of Mount Ephraim's zoning ordinance prohibited
all uses not expressly provided for by the city's zoning scheme. Live entertainment
was among the uses excluded from the scheme.
111. Id, at 74-75. The Court cited Graynard v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116-17
(1972), in stating that a "regulation must be narrowly tailored to further the state's
legitimate interest." Id
112. 682 F.2d at 1208-09.
113. Id. at 1208-09, 1216-17. The court attached great importance to the recurring
requirement that an ordinance must be "narrowly drawn to serve a legitimate govern-
mental interest with only minimal intrusion upon First Amendment freedoms." Id. at
1216.
114. 657 F.2d at 98-99. In Keego Harbor, the zoning ordinance effectively banned
adult theaters from the jurisdiction instead of merely dispersing them or restricting
them to specified areas as in Young, 427 U.S. 50.
115. 657 F.2d at 98.
116. 681 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1982).
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tivity without affecting the location or availability of protected adult
speech.1l 7
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF ZONING UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: REEXAMINATION AND REINTERPRETATION
A. Judicial Discomfort with the Balancing Test of Track II
As part II has shown, the Supreme Court has generally analyzed
the problem of adult zoning along the second of two tracks described
by leading constitutional scholars.11 8 Consequently, the track II anal-
ysis has developed into a powerful limit upon zoning power. Adult
zoning regulations will now be reviewed in light of three factors: the
extent of infringement upon protected speech; the extent to which
the zoning fails to serve a proper governmental interest; and the ex-
tent to which the zoning law is narrowly drawn.11 9 The courts have
used this analysis to invalidate many improper zoning laws.120
Despite the power of the balancing test, the courts are uncomforta-
ble as the arbiters of conflict between zoning power and the first
amendment. The 4-1-4 decision in Youngl 21 is symptomatic of the
disagreement in the Supreme Court over how the problem of adult
zoning should be handled.122 Some of this discomfort is unavoidable.
117. Id. at 1246-47. The court cited Young, 427 U.S. at 63 n.18, in support of its
statement that an ordinance which merely regulates the "time, place, or manner of
protected speech will be upheld if necessary to further significant governmental inter-
ests." 682 F.2d at 1246.
118. See L. TRIBE, supra note 31 and accompanying text. Schad, 452 U.S. at 61, and
Young, 427 U.S. at 50, were analyzed along track II of the two track test.
119. See Schad, 452 U.S. at 68-70 (Court must assess whether the governmental in-
terest is substantial, whether there are means that may be less intrusive on an activity
protected by the first amendment, whether the law infringes upon a protected liberty,
and whether the law is narrowly drawn); Case Comment, supra note 31, at 240
("Three separate factors must carefully be weighed: The importance of the interests
served by the law, the extent to which it abridges free speech, and the extent to which
alternative regulations could substantially satisfy the same interests while intruding
less on protected speech.").
120. See, e.g., Schad, 452 U.S. at 61 (invalidation of ordinance designed to exclude
live entertainment throughout the borough of Mount Ephraim); Basiardanes, 682 F.2d
at 1203 (invalidation of ordinance restricting the operation of adult theatres to certain
areas and prohibiting adult theater street advertising); Avalon, 667 F.2d at 659 (invali-
dation of ordinance prohibiting exhibition or sale of any sexually explicit film,
whether or not obscene, within one hundred yards of specific areas); Keego Harbor, 657
F.2d at 94 (invalidation of ordinance which effectively prohibited "adult" movie thea-
tres in town).
121. 427 U.S. at 50. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text for a synopsis of
the Young decision.
122. Further evidence of discord in the high Court over the review of zoning and
the first amendment can be seen in Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 490, a 4-2-1-1-1 opinion
Adult zoning represents a clash between two of society's most heart-
felt desires: the desire to exercise freedom of expression, and the de-
sire to live in a community free from distasteful activity. As long as
people disagree over what speech is tasteful, this clash will be pres-
ent. Sexually explicit speech will always offend somebody. However,
some of the discomfort can be avoided because it arises not from the
clash of values, but from two difficulties with the balancing analysis
currently used by most courts.
First, balancing is flexible, but it is not sensitive enough to the pur-
poseful suppression of free speech. Balancing looks at the effects of
regulation. If an infringement of adult speech is found, it is balanced
against the justifications offered. 123 The municipality's possible in-
tent to suppress speech is not part of the balancing equation. True,
the question of intent may be partially considered when a court trig-
gers the track II balancing test in favor of the track I categorization
test,124 but there is a tendency for courts to immediately balance
without careful prior consideration of intent, largely because the
Supreme Court did so in Young and Schad.125 As will be shown, the
circuit courts are aware of this problem, and will sometimes compen-
sate for it.
The second difficulty with balancing is that it offers no hard and
fast legal rule upon which a court can rely. This is particularly prob-
lematic when a judge reviews a thorny problem like adult zoning.
Most people are torn between their belief in free speech and their
sympathy for towns which must deal with the problems posed by
adult establishments. The courts are similarly torn, and their indeci-
concerning the zoning of billboards. One might point to Schad, 452 U.S. at 61, as evi-
dence of an emerging consensus because Schad was a 6-2 decision. However, Schad
was an easy case for the Court to decide because the degree of infringement upon pro-
tected speech was so large and the degree of justification so small.
123. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
124. The courts, in their evaluation of the first amendment claims, will inquire into
whether the law is aimed at the communicative or noncommunicative impact of a par-
ticular act. The purported purpose of the law determines the particular test to be
used. See L. TRIBE, supra note 31, § 12-2, at 582; Case Comment, supra note 31, at 235-
39.
125. In both Schad, 452 U.S. at 61, and Young, 427 U.S. at 50, it was unclear
whether the challenged ordinance was aimed at regulating the content of the material
affected, or was aimed at the undesireable side effects created by the availability of
such material to the public. The Court in each case, however, determined the constitu-
tionality of the ordinance using the track II balancing test without inquiring into the
purpose for the law.
The ambiguity concerning the use of the two tracks is examined in Case Comment,
supra note 31, at 237-38. That note discusses the need to define the differences be-
tween which regulations are content-based, and therefore to be analyzed along track I,
and which regulations are aimed only at the side effects of speech and therefore to be
analyzed along track II. An interesting possibility is that an inquiry into the content-
based nature of a regulation may be seen as an inquiry into the intent of the regulator.
See infira notes 129-58.
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sion causes them to reach out for some kind of tangible legal rule
which offers guidance. Furthermore, courts realize that unless they
base their review of adult zoning on more than the individual values
of judges, the very legitimacy of their review may collapse.126
One way courts demonstrate their desire for a tangible legal rule is
by balancing less and focusing more on one element of the balancing
equation. If that element becomes large enough, then the regulation
involved will be invalidated. Alexander127 provides an excellent ex-
ample. The Eighth Circuit discussed only the extent of infringement
upon protected speech throughout its entire opinion. No mention
was made of the city's justification for a zoning law which dispersed
adult uses throughout Minneapolis with the effect of eliminating
two-thirds of the locations for adult bookstores. The court simply
held that the extent of adult speech permitted by the ordinance was
constitutionally insufficient.128
Another, and perhaps more fruitful, method of gaining the security
of legal rules is for the courts to introduce the question of intent into
the analysis. Without admitting it, some courts have used facts which
suggest, but do not prove, an intent to suppress adult speech to tip
their balancing scales in favor of the invalidation of an adult zoning
ordinance.129 Other courts have openly turned to a careful and ex-
plicit search for intent to eliminate the need for balancing.1o
The use of facts which are probative of intent to tip the scales in
126. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
127. 698 F.2d at 936.
128. Id. at 938-39. The direction taken by the Alexander court has its attractions.
Focusing strictly upon the degree of infringement is easy to apply because a court can
simply determine what number or percentage of adult uses may be properly elimi-
nated by looking at previous cases. For example, if town A successfully restricts the
market for adult speech by 5%, then so may town B, and so on. This eliminates the
uncomfortable task of balancing. However, such a test seems too rigid to be successful.
Some towns may have more compelling reasons for restricting speech than others.
129. See Basiardanes, 682 F.2d at 1216 (court discussed the timing of the passage of
the ordinance, the sequence of events leading to its passage, the history of the ordi-
nance, and the narrow focus of the ordinance to show an improper motive to "squelch
free speech"); Keego Harbor, 657 F.2d at 98 (court pointed to the scarcity of objective
evidence supporting the city's justification for the zoning ordinance implying an im-
proper motive on the part of the city).
130. See Kuzinich, 689 F.2d at 1347-49 (court, in reviewing summary judgment in
favor of constitutionality of ordinance, emphasized "that zoning may not be employed
for the purpose of restricting the content of speech, including that which is sexually
explicit"); Avalon, 667 F.2d at 662 (court invalidated zoning ordinance expressly on
grounds that it fails the test requiring the governmental interest to be unrelated to the
suppression of free expression).
favor of invalidation can be seen in Keego Harborl-3 and Ba-
siardanes. 132 In Keego Harbor, the Sixth Circuit focused on the fact
that the city tried to justify its adult zoning law on the basis of facts
raised after the enactment of the law.133 Although the court never
mentioned intent as a factor in its decision, it seems that the court
regarded the city's failure to consider factual support for the ordi-
nance before its enactment as probative of the city's desire to regulate
adult speech for illegitimate purposes.134 At the very least, the fail-
ure to carefully consider the facts before enactment meant that the
city's decision could not have been the product of careful delibera-
tion. Such hasty decisions should not be permitted where precious
first amendment rights are at stake. Towns should be encouraged to
tread upon protected speech only when necessary and only after
careful deliberation.13 5
The Basiardanes court made the same observation regarding the
consideration of facts before the enactment of the zoning.136 The
Fifth Circuit held that pre-enactment justification was a requirement
for constitutional approval.137 It also probed more deeply into facts
probative of intent. 38 The history of the zoning's enactment cast
doubt upon the city's motives. Galveston did not regulate adult thea-
ters until Basiardanes announced the opening of his theater across
the street from the newly renovated Grand Opera House. Such ac-
tion on the part of the city certainly suggests a desire to suppress
adult speech because of its offensiveness to opera patrons. 3 9 Simi-
larly, the narrow focus of the zoning suggested official hostility to
adult speech. For example, no restrictions were placed on pool halls,
massage parlors or bars. The zoning affected only adult theaters and
bookstores.140
131. 657 F.2d at 94.
132. 682 F.2d at 1203.
133. Keego Harbor, 657 F.2d at 98. The city attempted "to justify the zoning restric-
tions as necessary to prevent 'blight' and to control traffic." Id. The court noted, how-
ever, that there appeared to be no objective evidence supporting this justification at
the time Keego Harbor enacted the ordinance. IM See supra notes 92-96 and accompa-
nying text for a synopsis of the Keego Harbor opinion.
134. 657 F.2d at 98.
135. See id at 99. The court stated that where "an ordinance effectively bans mate-
rial that is entitled to at least some degree of First Amendment protection, ... that
ordinance must be justified and drawn to further those justifications." Id.
136. See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text for a synopsis of the Basiardanes
opinion.
137. Basiardanes, 682 F.2d at 1215. The court stated that "[t]he city must buttress
its assertion with evidence that the factual basis was considered by the city in passing
the ordinance." Id
138. Id. at 1216.
139. Id. The court concluded that the city's motive in passing the ordinance was to
force the adult theater away from the opera house for fear that the theater would de-
ter patrons from attending the opera.
140. Id.
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The explicit use of a search for intent and the discarding of balanc-
ing can be seen in Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson as well.141 In
the fall of 1980, Avalon obtained a permit to operate an adult book-
store and movie theater in North Little Rock, Arkansas. The theater
and bookstore would have been the only adult establishments in
town. The day the permit was issued, the city council convened a
special meeting to enact an emergency zoning ordinance which pro-
hibited placement of adult uses within a hundred yards of a church,
school, park, or residential area. The Eighth Circuit found that the
ordinance restricted the market for adult speech,142 but it did not be-
gin a search for justification. Instead, the court focused on the city's
reaction to the impending opening of the bookstore to find an inten-
tional suppression of protected speech. 143
The Ninth Circuit has also indicated that it will carefully consider
a town's intent in regulating adult speech before balancing. In
Kuzinich v. County of Santa aara,144 the court considered an appeal
from summary judgment in favor of the county. At issue was a zon-
ing amendment which rendered unlawful an adult movie theater and
an adult bookstore owned by the plaintiff. In its decision to reverse,
the court spent one paragraph considering the factual bases for the
zoning while writing at length on the evidence which indicated the
intentional suppression of speech.145 The court indicated that the ev-
idence supported the conclusion that the basic purpose of the ordi-
nance was to control pornography.146
Similarly, in Ebel v. City of Corona,147 the Ninth Circuit ordered a
preliminary injunction against the enforcement of an adult zoning
law similar to the one overturned in Avalon. 148 The court noted that
Ebel owned the only adult bookstore in town and that testimony at
141. 667 F.2d at 659.
142. Id. at 662. The court focused on the fact that the ordinance had the effect of
"virtually suppressing public access to sexually oriented (but nonobscene) adult en-
tertainment." Id.
143. Id. at 662-63. The court seemed to support its conclusion that the ordinance
was an unconstitutional content-based regulation by placing emphasis on evidence
showing official hostility to adult speech. Alderman Duke testified that he had hoped
the ordinance would keep the theater from opening. Id. at 663 n.9.
144. 689 F.2d at 1345.
145. Id. at 1348. The court focused on a report prepared by an intern to the board
of supervisors recommending the elimination of the adult establishments. The report
stated that the establishments were a "public nuisance," and would create public alien-
ation from the board unless they were eliminated. Id,
146. Id.
147. 698 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1983).
148. Id. at 391.
public hearings was specifically aimed against it.149 The chairman of
the planning commission had stated that the zoning law would "'re-
move the bookstore,'" and a planning commissioner had said that he
" 'would like to see the bookstore out of Corona.' "150 The court went
on to consider the possibility of balancing at trial, but its considera-
tion of the actual purpose or intent of the ordinance was clear. 5 1
As discussed above, courts are uncomfortable with the role of bal-
ancer in reviewing adult zoning laws. Courts have reacted to the in-
herent uncertainty of balancing by reaching for firm legal rules.152
In Alexander,153 Keego Harbor,15 4 and Basiardanes,155 this reaching
was done by modifying the usual balancing test, while in Avalon,156
Kuzinich,15 7 and Ebel, 158 the usual balancing test was discarded. All
of these efforts have been at least partially successful in helping
judges sort out the difficulties inherent in first amendment review of
adult zoning, and they lead to a proposed revision of the current
method of review.
IV. A PROPOSED REVISION OF FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF
ADULT ZONING AND THE EFFECTS OF THIS REVISION
A. A Proposed Revision of the First Amendment Analysis of Adult
Zoning
The primary purpose of this proposed revision is to fully defend
first amendment rights without some of the judicial discomfort asso-
ciated with balancing. Consequently, it will rely more upon firm
legal rules and rely less upon balancing.
The first rule of this revision is the invalidation of any zoning ordi-
nance which is intended to restrict protected speech. Naturally, the
town whose regulation is under review will contend that the zoning
is motivated by some proper purpose, but the court should hear evi-
dence from the litigants which is probative of the actual intent of the
municipality. If the evidence demonstrates an intentional suppres-
sion of speech, the zoning is invalidated without further inquiry.159
149. Id. at 393.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See supra notes 118-51 and accompanying text.
153. 698 F.2d at 936.
154. 657 F.2d at 94.
155. 682 F.2d at 1203.
156. 667 F.2d at 659.
157. 689 F.2d at 1345.
158. 698 F.2d at 390.
159. See, e.g., Ebel, 698 F.2d at 393 (court held ordinance banning adult bookstores
unconstitutional because its actual purpose was to obstruct the exercise of the first
amendment); Kuzinich, 689 F.2d at 1348 (court held unconstitutional an ordinance
banning adult movie theaters because its basic purpose was to control pornography);
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This rule is slightly different from the threshhold test currently
used. Under current doctrine, courts look to see if the challenged
regulation focuses on the content of protected speech.160 Under the
suggested rule, a court would ignore the regulatory focus and con-
sider instead motivation. This would result in the invalidation of reg-
ulations which did not focus on the content of speech but were
designed to suppress speech. 161
The second rule relied upon looks to the effects of adult zoning. If
adult uses are banned or effectively banned, the ordinance is held un-
constitutional unless the city comes forward with compelling justifi-
cation for its action. 162
Avalon, 667 F.2d at 661 (court held that the city must submit specific empirical find-
ings of deleterious effect upon the surrounding neighborhood in order to support its
stated reasons for enacting an ordinance prohibiting adult movie theaters). See also
Comment, supra note 2, at 305, 309 for a brief consideration of motivation as a key fac-
tor in reviewing adult zoning.
160. See, e.g., Slaton, 413 U.S. at 57 (court held that states have a legitimate interest
in regulating the sale and exhibition of obscene materials because such markets result
in crime); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574 (court held that a statute prohibiting the use of
offensive words tending to cause a breach of the peace was within the state's constitu-
tional power).
161. This test is broader than the content-based test for track I. It arises from the
fact that content-based regulations are improper because they generally intend to sup-
press speech. See Case Comment, supra note 31, at 237-38. However, if the purpose of
invalidating content-based regulation of speech is to assure government neutrality in
the "free marketplace of ideas," then it makes sense to promptly invalidate all laws
which are not intended to be neutral in that marketplace. Thus, the key inquiry
should not be whether the law under scrutiny categorizes speech on the basis of con-
tent, but whether the law intends to suppress protected speech. Under the proposed
intent-based test, content-based regulations would still be invalidated, since they in-
tend to suppress speech. Additionally, laws not based upon the content of speech
which intend to suppress speech would be invalidated. An example of such a law
would be one levying extremely heavy licensing fees upon all entertainment establish-
ments with the intent of eliminating certain less profitable forms of entertainment
from town. Such a law would not be invalidated under a content-based test, but it
would be invalidated under an intent-based test as the government would not be acting
in a neutral fashion. Thus, an intent based test gives broader protection to the consti-
tutional value of government neutrality in the free speech market.
Recent cases may indicate that an intent-based test is already emerging in the fed-
eral courts because zoning ordinances are being declared unconstitutional due to an in-
tent to suppress protected adult speech. See Ebel, 698 F.2d at 393 (city's intent to
harass and obstruct); Kuzinich, 689 F.2d at 1348 (intent to control pornography im-
proper purpose); Avalon, 667 F.2d at 663 (city must bear burden of justifying its
purpose).
162. This is intended to emulate the strict scrutiny applied to suspect racial classifi-
cations under the equal protection clause of the Constitution. See, e.g., Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (Court applied strict scrutiny to strike down racial
segregation in public schools); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)
(concept of strict scrutiny for racial classifications was introduced). The application of
strict scrutiny to zoning laws banning all adult uses from a town would probably inval-
Lastly, if the zoning under review passes the two tests described
above, the court will be forced to balance. If this is the case, the
question of constitutionality is probably close. Therefore, the sensi-
tivity of a balancing test will be needed. However, one factor will be
added to the balaincing equation: the factor of intent. If the court
finds evidence which indicates, but does not prove, purposeful sup-
pression of speech, then that evidence should weigh in favor of
invalidation. 16 3
B. Evaluation and Effect of the Proposed Revision
The proposed revised method of reviewing adult zoning offers sev-
eral advantages over the old method.
First, by insisting upon a careful determination of the intent of the
regulating city, the proposed revised analysis is likely to better pro-
tect constitutional values by invalidating all purposeful suppression
of adult speech. Under the old method of analysis, cities generally at-
tempt to suppress protected speech (a clearly unconstitutional act) by
claiming that their efforts seek only to regulate the effects of speech.
This shifts judicial review of the challenged law to a balancing test,
which in turn increases the likelihood that unconstitutional acts will
go unimpeded. By contrast, a detailed inquiry into the motivation of
the regulating town would immediately invalidate all attempts to
suppress protected speech, no matter how they were disguised or
characterized.164
Second, the new analysis protects speech by holding any ban of
adult establishments unconstitutional unless the zoning city presents
compelling justification for the ordinance.16 5 Critics may contend
that adult uses present problems of a special nature which justify
idate such a law, as courts are generally reluctant to make a finding of compelling jus-
tification in the context of strict scrutiny. Thus, cities will generally be unable to ban
adult speech. However, a city which is zoned as 100% residential may be able to come
forward with compelling justification for a ban of public adult establishments. Such a
city might be able to show that the presence of any adult establishment would suffi-
ciently destroy the residential nature of the town to justify a ban. This possible justifi-
cation for banning adult speech has been suggested by the Supreme Court in Schad:
"Our decision today does not establish that every unit of local government entrusted
with zoning responsibilities must provide a commercial zone in which live entertain-
ment is permitted." 452 U.S. at 75 n.18 (emphasis added). See also Note, Schad v. Bor-
ough of Mount Ephraim: A Pyrrhic Victory for Freedom of Expression?, 15 Loy.
L.A.L. REV. 321 (1982), for an indepth discussion of how communities may exclude
protected expression by manipulating their zoning power.
163. See supra notes 131-40 and accompanying text. This is analogous to the situa-
tions in the Keego Harbor and Basiardanes cases.
164. Balancing always gives a court an opportunity to ignore or lightly regard evi-
dence of intentional suppression of speech.
165. See Ebel, 698 F.2d at 393, where the court held that the city must show that the
adult zoning ordinance furthers an important governmental interest and does not pur-
posefully supress free expression.
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banning them from town. However, the Supreme Court is clearly
unwilling to accept this notion:
Mount Ephraim contends that it may selectively exclude commercial live
entertainment from the broad range of commercial uses permitted in the Bor-
ough for reasons normally associated with zoning in commercial districts, that
is, to avoid the problems that may be associated with live entertainment, such
as parking, trash, police protection, and medical facilities. The Borough has
presented no evidence, and it is not immediately apparent as a matter of expe-
rience, that live entertainment poses problems of this nature more significant
than those associated with various permitted uses; nor does it appear that the
Borough's zoning authority has arrived at a defensible conclusion that unusual
problems are presented by live entertainment. 1 6 6
This reluctance is further demonstrated in Young, where the Court
noted that the concentration, and not the presence, of adult uses cre-
ated the urban blight which justified the regulation upheld in that
case.
167
The clear implication of Schad and Young is that even if adult uses
do pose special problems (and this is open to debate), their mere
presence alone does not necessarily create those problems.16s In
turn, this determination means that a properly regulated adult use is
no more incompatible with general commercial or industrial land
uses than is the hypothetical restaurant of Schad.169 Therefore, the
legitimate goals of zoning may be reached by regulating, and not ban-
ning, adult uses. Since a ban on adult uses can serve no purpose
which could not be served by well-conceived regulation, these bans
should be held unconstitutional in light of first amendment
guarantees. 170
The requirement of compelling justification for bans of adult uses
makes good public policy as well. Some cities may be able to disguise
their intent to restrict protected speech. The test proposed provides a
valuable function in that a town which has successfully hidden its in-
tent to suppress speech will find itself faced with a difficult choice. It
will have to choose between a law which permits at least some adult
speech in town or strict scrutiny by the courts and probable invalida-
166. Schad, 452 U.S. at 73-74.
167. Young, 427 U.S. at 60-61, 71 n.35.
168. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
169. To clarify, there is no reason why a properly regulated adult use should cause
any greater land use problem than a normal commercial use.
170. In other words, Schad and Young imply that it is neither necessary nor consti-
tutionally proper to ban adult uses from a town in order to achieve the legitimate po-
lice power goals of eliminating crime and urban blight. Of course, it is theoretically
possible that a situation justifying such a ban might be presented to a court, but this
justification should be compelling. Hence the use of a strict scrutiny test.
tion of a law which permits no adult speech in town. Few, if any,
communities would choose to undergo strict scrutiny, so the second
rule curbs purposeful suppression of protected adult speech by reduc-
ing the efficacy of any hidden suppression of speech.
Third, the new analysis would promote judicial economy by the use
of firm legal rules. Both methods of analysis require detailed fact-
finding by the courts, but the new method saves the courts the
trouble of balancing unless it is absolutely necessary. Under the old
analysis, balancing would probably have been performed regardless
of the intent or effect of the zoning under review. Under the new
analysis, balancing would take place only if the zoning neither in-
tends to suppress nor bans protected adult speech.
Fourth, the use of firm legal rules would provide city planners
with a better understanding of the permissible uses of the zoning
power. Under the old analysis, planners had only the balancing pref-
erences of individual judges to guide them in drafting zoning laws.
The firm rules of the new analysis would give city officials more gui-
dance. Planners would be careful to leave room for adult uses be-
cause most bans of adult speech will not survive a strict scrutiny
analysis.171 This in turn would result in imaginative and innovative
regulation within the bounds of the Constitution as planners sought
new ways to regulate adult uses. Furthermore, less litigation would
occur because fewer owners of adult establishments would have
grievances to press.
Fifth, the proposed use of intent as a factor in balancing would
make the courts more sensitive to the spirit of the Constitution. The
Constitution should not tolerate infringement of protected speech
when the motivation for the infringement is questionable. Stronger,
weightier justification should be required to uphold the zoning under
review.
This new proposal, however, might generate four areas of criticism.
The first criticism would be that the courts already consider intent
before any balancing takes place by considering the issue of content
neutrality, and that therefore a major part of the proposal adds noth-
ing new. This criticism is plausible, but in practice, the Supreme
Court has not examined the intent behind adult zoning as rigorously
as it should. At the very least, courts should explicitly consider facts
probative of intent. Even if no conclusive finding is made, the evi-
dence discovered can be used in balancing at a later stage of the re-
viewing process. Furthermore, courts should be reminded that all
intentional suppression of speech is unconstitutional. The difficulties
of balancing divert judicial attention from this fundamental rule.
171. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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The proposal curbs this problem by making the defense of the rule
the court's first duty in reviewing adult zoning laws.
The second criticism might be that the new proposal's use of firm
rules in lieu of balancing would trap the courts into unjust results.172
This can be answered by noting that the new analysis is flexible
when necessary because it resorts to balancing when the question of
a zoning law's constitutionality is close. The two rules which a law
must pass to reach a balancing test only screen out regulations whose
constitutional validity is highly improbable.173 Other regulations will
be tested by balancing.
A third attack might be that the proposal improperly introduces in-
tent into the balancing equation. However, a balancing equation
which utilizes intent as a factor is more sensitive to the Constitution.
Laws of questionable motivation should be overturned. Failure to in-
sist upon judicial scrutiny of the motives behind adult zoning will in-
vite clever and unjustified suppression of protected speech.
The fourth and final attack could be that the proposal defends free
speech, but not to a great enough extent. Others might argue that
the proposal grants too much protection to speech. This is a legiti-
mate criticism. However, the purpose of this proposal is not to re-
form the contours of constitutional protection. Instead, the proposal
is designed to preserve current constitutional values while removing
excess baggage associated with present-day analysis. Thus, if a clear
change from current constitutional doctrine is required, a different
proposal must be put forward.174
V. CONCLUSION
Zoning has a role in modern society, but it also has the potential
for abuse. This possible misuse has created tension between the zon-
ing power and the first amendment, particularly in the zoning of
adult establishments which offer constitutionally protected speech.
The current manner of review utilized by the courts in determining
the validity or invalidity of zoning ordinances regulating adult speech
has troubled judicial comfort and ad hoc analysis. The judiciary it-
self, either consciously or instinctively, has sought to develop a
172. This argument is based on the premise that firm rules are too inflexible.
173. Even then, a compelling justification may justify measures as extreme as a ban
on adult speech.
174. Another possible proposal is to create a distinct "middle tier" of review for
adult speech. See generally, Note, Second Class Speech. The Court's Refinement of
Content Regulation: Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 61 NEB. L. REV. 361 (1982).
clearer and more efficient method of review. This article's proposal
suggests a new method which would provide ample protection to con-
stitutional rights and make analysis easier for both courts and layper-
sons. It also encourages innovative, non-restrictive regulation of
adult speech. Although the revision makes use of firm rules, it is
flexible when necessary, thus allowing the law to grow and change as
new problems arise. As such, it is an improvement over the current
analysis utilized in the judicial review of adult zoning.
